Abstract. This paper investigates the private provision of public goods in segregated societies. While most research agrees that segregation undermines public goods provision the findings are mixed for private provision: social interactions, being strong within groups and limited across groups, may either increase or impede voluntary contributions. Surprisingly, very little light is shed in the literature on the impact of government intervention on private provision in networks. This paper, first, develops an index, called the Bonacich transfer index, for societies with general network structures of social interactions, which, roughly speaking, measures the impact of redistributive policies. Then, the paper shows that the Bonacich transfer index vanishes in large segregated societies, which suggests an "asymptotic neutrality" of government intervention.
introduction
Diversity is becoming a pervasive feature of most societies. Yet, in spite of the numerous gains from cultural differences within society, diversity often breeds segregation, which is detrimental to public goods provision. Segregation may occur along one or a few lines such as ethnicity, religion, language, and income, and its main aspect of limited social interactions across different groups is perceived to undermine the quality of public amenities and hamper public projects. There is robust empirical evidence in the literature; in fact, amongst others, to quote Banerjee, Iyer, and Rohini (2005)"One of the most powerful hypotheses in political economy. . .".
The literature is furnished with a variety of mechanisms to explore the channels through which segregation operates on public goods provision. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) argue that the divergence in preferences across groups for public goods -languages of instruction at school or the location of the highway-sharply dilutes the support for their provision. Fernández and Levy (2008) show that divergence in preferences may affect the choice of optimal funding policies for public goods. Ethnic fragmentation also results in less spending on education in Poterba (1997) and Goldin and Katz (1999) and reduces growth in Easterly and Levine (1999) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) . Besley, Pande, Rahman, and Rao (2004) show that leaders provide public goods essentially to their ethnic groups, largely excluding others and Vigdor (2004) observes a low demand for public goods due to minimal altruistic preferences. This paper seeks to understand how segregation impacts the private provision of public goods. In general, public goods are provided by both government and indi- and Rodgers (2012), and Golub and Jackson (2012) that models a random process of network formation strongly influenced by homophily. Our approach, although it is quite different, takes advantage of the insights of the above mentioned literatures, since we investigate fixed network structures of social interactions that already display segregation and not the matching processes nor the network formation dynamics leading to them.
vate provision in societies with general network structures of social interactions. In our model, the channel of government intervention is lump-sum income redistribution, which plays a central role in economics for achieving various distributional objectives, and is often employed as a benchmark for other channels of intervention. The scale of income redistribution is crucial to our analysis since, similar to the standard private provision literature, we focus on budget-balanced transfers of relatively small magnitude so that the set of contributors remains unchanged. It is well known from Warr (1983) and Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) that the private provision model of pure public goods is subject to a strong neutrality result, whereby income redistribution has no effect on either the aggregate provision of public goods or on consumption of private goods. The neutrality result, further analyzed in Bernheim (1986) and Andreoni (1989) , is equivalent to a complete crowding-out, "dollar-for-dollar " for tax-financed government provision, which has traditionally been the focus of much attention. Crowding-out effects can be a serious problem for public goods that rely mostly on private provision, and may limit the overall effectiveness of income redistribution.
In the case of local public goods, where not all consumers are necessarily linked to each other, it is unclear how much of the income redistribution affects consumers' welfare, or equivalently, how much of government intervention is negated by consumers' actions. We show that, under a standard utilitarian approach, the welfare effect of income redistribution is determined by the Bonacich centrality. Bonacich centrality, due to Bonacich (1987) , is a vector that measures power and prestige in social networks and was shown to be related to the Nash equilibrium outcomes of a game by the key contribution of Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006).
Quite different from the Nash-Bonacich linkage, Allouch (2012) shows that the effect of income redistribution on the aggregate provision is also determined by Bonacich centrality. Hence, the Bonacich centrality vector is key to the analysis of the impact of income redistribution on both aggregate welfare and aggregate provision. 
The model
We consider a society comprising n consumers embedded on a fixed network g of social interactions. The society is divided into T ≥ 2 groups of consumers of similar attributes which may involve, amongst other things, ethnicity, religion, language, and income. Let Π = {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C T } denote the partition of the set of consumers into T non-empty and pairwise disjoint groups. Le C t i denote consumer i's own group and N i denote consumer i's neighbors. We do not assume that necessarily N i ⊂ C t i and therefore consumers may have social ties with other consumers from any social group, however, for ease of exposition, we assume that the network g is connected.
The preferences of each consumer i = 1, . . . , n, are represented by a twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly quasi-concave utility function
, where x i is consumer i's private good consumption, q i is consumer i's public good provision, and Q −i = j∈N i q j is the sum of public good provisions of consumer i's neighbors in the society. Furthermore, the public good can be produced from the private good via a unit-linear production technology. Therefore, the price of private and public goods can be normalized to p = (p x , p Q ) = (1, 1). Notice that each consumer may benefit from the public good provision of all his neighbors regardless of their group identities. For each consumer i the utility maximization problem can be written
where w i is his income (exogenously fixed). The utility maximization problem can be represented equivalently as
where consumer i chooses his (local) public good consumption,
or, equivalently
We focus our analysis on a particular preferences.
Although the assumption of Gorman polar form preferences is quite restrictive, it includes some interesting and important classes of preferences, for instance, both
Cobb-Douglas preferences and quasi-linear preferences with respect to a common numeraire satisfy this assumption.
Let G = [g ij ] denote the adjacency matrix of the network g, where g ij = 1
indicates that consumer i = j are neighbors and g ij = 0 otherwise. The adjacency matrix of the network, G, is symmetric with nonnegative entries and therefore has a complete set of real eigenvalues (not necessarily distinct), denoted by λ max (G) =
, where λ max (G) is the largest eigenvalue and λ min (G)
is the lowest eigenvalue of G. By the Perron-Frobenius Theorem, it holds that
[.
The network normality assumption is equivalent to
, 1[, which amounts to both the normality of the private good and a strong normality of the public good. Allouch (2012) introduces the assumption of network normality, which may also accommodate nonlinear best-reply functions, and establishes the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the private provision of public goods on networks.
Government intervention and private provision
This section explores the effects of government intervention on private provision.
The government aims to achieve socially optimal outcomes by drawing on income redistribution as a policy instrument. Income redistribution takes the form of lumpsum transfers, which are traditionally viewed as as a reference point for other policy instruments. Government intervention in private provision is very much in the spirit of the second welfare theorem although, unlike competitive equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium outcomes will typically be inefficient . We denote by a budget-balanced transfer, a t = (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n )
T ∈ R n such that
. . , q * n ) denote the Nash equilibrium corresponding to the income distribution w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) and (q t 1 , . . . , q t n ) denote the Nash equilibrium corresponding to the income distribution w + t = (w 1 + t 1 , . . . , w n + t n ). Similar to Warr (1983) and Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), we will focus our analysis on income redistributions that leaves the set of contributors unchanged, and we will refer to them as "relatively small". In general, there are compelling reasons for presuming that not all consumers will be contributing to the public good. For simplicity, passing to subnetworks if necessary, we assume that all consumers are contributors. Notice that an income distribution almost proportional to the eigenvector centrality, the unique unit eigenvector associated with λ max , will always lead to an interior Nash equilibrium.
3.1. Bonacich centrality. The key contribution of Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006) was first to relate the Nash equilibrium outcomes of a game to the Bonacich centrality vector, due to Bonacich (1987) , defined by
where 1 is the n-dimensional vector with all components equal one and a is the attenuation parameter. The Bonacich centrality describes the potential importance, influence, prominence of a consumer in the network. Since for a <
and (G k ) ij counts the total number of walks of length k from i to j. The Bonacich centrality of a consumer i can be interpreted as follows:
Intuitively, the Bonacich centrality of a consumer i counts the number of walks emanating from i discounted by a to the power of their length. Hence, the attenuation parameter a captures the decay of influence of distant consumers on a particular consumer Bonacich centrality. 
Proof. First, it follows from (2) that for each consumer i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
Rearranging terms, it follows that (I + aG)(q t − q * ) = (1 − a)t, and therefore q t − q * = (1 − a)(I + aG) −1 t. Hence, it holds that
The assumption of network normality, needed for the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium, may be relaxed and Proposition 3.1 still holds partially. Indeed, for almost any a ∈ [0, 1] the matrix I + aG is invertible. Therefore, similar to Theorem 1 in Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), for almost any Nash equilibrium q * corresponding to the income distribution w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) and any transfer of relatively small magnitude t, it may be easily checked that q * + (1 − a)(I + aG) −1 t is a Nash equilibrium corresponding to the income distribution w + t = (w 1 + t 1 , . . . , w n + t n ).
3.2.
Welfare effect of income redistribution. We take a standard utilitarian approach in order to understand the welfare effect of income redistribution. Specifically, we consider the (indirect) social welfare function
which is the sum of utilities achieved by consumers at the unique Nash equilibrium with income distribution w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ).
Proposition 3.2.
There exists a positive real number κ such that for any relatively small transfer t it holds that
utility function can be written as
where α(p) > 0 is common to all consumers. From the utility maximization in (1) it follows that at the unique Nash equilibrium each consumer maximizes his utility with respect to the price p = (p x , p Q ) = (1, 1) and social wealth w i + Q * −i . Therefore it holds that
Hence, it follows from (3) and (4) that
Therefore, if one sets κ = α(p)(1−a) a > 0 the desired result follows, that is, 
SW(w
Therefore, the maximum of SW(w + t) − SW(w) for t ∈ B T occurs at
Proposition 4.1 relates the the Bonacich transfer index to the potential per-capita welfare gain after income redistribution. Hence, the Bonacich transfer index corresponds to an average utilitarian approach to welfare, which in turn is adequate to deal with population change. It is worth noticing that when the the size of the society is fixed, the average utilitarian approach is identical in its policy recommendations to the standard utilitarian approach.
Remark 2. The optimal income redistributions for raising per-capita welfare and raising per-capita public good provision, for t ∈ B T , are diametrically opposite to each other. Nonetheless, their impacts may be simultaneously related to the Bonacich transfer index since it may be also shown that
This suggests that the Bonacich transfer index is a useful benchmark for various effects of income redistribution. Now, we establish that the Bonacich transfer index may be expressed from a selection of the spectrum of the network. A similar result was established by Allouch (2012) for the Bonacich centrality vector. The intuition is as follows: Bonacich centrality vector is closely related to the number of walks in the network, which in turn may be computed directly from a selection of the spectrum of the network. An eigenvalue µ of G, which has an associated eigenvector not orthogonal to the vector 1, is said to be a main eigenvalue (Cvetković (1970) ). By the Perron-Frobenius theorem, the maximum eigenvalue of G has an associated eigenvector with all its entries positive and, therefore, is a main eigenvalue. The distinct main eigenvalues The following proposition shows that the Bonacich transfer index may be expressed from the main part of the spectrum M.
Proof. Let u i be the unit eigenvector of the main eigenvalue µ i orthogonal to
The eigenvector u i is determined uniquely since we choose
to be the cosine of the acute angle between E G (µ i ) and 1. Let V be a matrix whose columns, v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n , are eigenvectors of G chosen to extend the eigenvectors {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u s } of G to an orthonormal basis of R n . Therefore, G = V DV T , where
From the Pythagorean theorem, it holds that
Therefore, it holds that
The Bonacich transfer index has a natural geometric interpretation, since it is related to the gap in Jensen's inequality 2 for the convex function φ(x) = x 2 , applied to the convex combination of
, . . . ,
1+aµs
with weights β 1 2 , β 2 2 , . . . , β s 2 . s ≥ 2. Moreover,
Obviously, since s ≥ 2 implies that β s < 1 it holds that
Hence it follows that 
Segregated society
This section computes the Bonacich transfer index for segregated societies with particular structure of social interactions. We introduce the following assumption about the network of social interactions of the society:
Segregated society:
(i) For each consumer i,
(ii) If consumers i, j belong to the same group, that is C t i = C t j , then
The segregated society assumption is about the density of links between the different groups of the society. Condition (i) stipulates that the number of links each consumer has to consumers from his own group exceeds the number of links he has to consumers from different groups. Condition (ii) is merely a network regularity requirement. It stipulates that the number of links a consumer in group C r has to consumers in group C l is independent of the choice of the consumer in C r .
Theorem 5.1. If the society is segregated then
Proof. Condition (ii) of segregated society implies that π = {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C T } defines an equitable partition of the set of consumers (see Powers and Sulaiman 
Observe that all the eigenvalues of G are real and so that the eigenvalues of G/π are is less than
Theorem 5.1 shows that the Bonacich transfer index vanishes in large segregated society, which suggests an asymptotic neutrality of income redistribution.
Examples
Consider a society comprising two groups of consumers C 1 and C 2 of sizes, respectively, n 1 and n 2 such that n 1 = 4n 2 . The society has a particular network structure of social interactions G defined as follows: for each consumer in C 1 the number of links to consumers from C 1 is d and the number of links to consumers from C 2 is r. For each consumer in C 2 the number of links to consumers from C 2 is d and the number of links to consumers from C 1 is (obviously) 4r. We assume that G is connected, that is, r > 0. Let us consider the adjacency matrix of the quotient graph g/π corresponding to the partition π = {C 1 , C 2 }:
Then, G has exactly two main eigenvalues and they are Observe that if r = 0 then we have the limit of an extremely segregated society.
Obviously, the network of social interactions is no longer connected and has now two unconnected groups. From Corollary 4.3 one may deduce that the Bonacich transfer index of each component is zero.
conclusion
Enhancing private provision of public goods has long been an important policy objective and our paper shows that understanding social networks is a key way to achieve this. To this effect, the Bonacich centrality index, developed in this paper, may be thought of as an instrument to capture the income redistribution multiplier effect within each society. The computation of the Bonacich centrality index shows that redistributive policies may have a normative significance in integrated societies and are ineffective in segregated societies. Surprisingly, this result is obtained only from the underlying network structure of social interactions since preferences of consumers care about their neighbors only insofar as they affect public good provision and not their group identities. Hence, one straightforward implication of our result suggests that the optimal policy to increase the income redistribution multiplier effect within a society by reshuffling the network structure of social interactions stipulates sponsoring bridges between groups while reducing links density within groups.
